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Abstract This paper compares the four national electronic Identity Management
Systems (eIDMS), which have been described in the previous chapters. The section
“Similarities and differences between four national eIDMS” will highlight the
differences between these systems conceived as socio-technical systems with regard
to the eID itself, the eID cards as tokens, the authentication processes as well as the
procedures for distribution and personalisation, the support provided for installing
the technology and any provider-related regulation. The section “A three-fold path
dependency”, according to the conceptual framework presented in the introductory
chapter to this special issue, compares the new electronic systems with the previous
ones in each country, in order to assess the continuation or changes with regard to
the organisational, technological and regulatory path of development. The following
sections explain the differences between the paths chosen and the path-related
changes by analysing the actor constellation of the institutional actors, in particular
the policy field and the power structure, as well as the context in which the policy
makers made their choices, looking at privacy and “Staatsverständnis” in particular.
Finally the diffusion and usage of the eID function will be compared and analysed,
discussing to what extent the new institution has made a contribution to solving the
policy problem it was developed for, e.g. providing a stronger authentication in order
to meet security concerns regarding e-government and e-commerce transactions and
avoiding new privacy infringements. Using grounded theory, the explanations
provided have the status of generalisations derived from the four cases. They have to
be considered as hypotheses, which will be checked for other countries in the
following papers of this special issue. The comparison of the four cases in this article
shows a high degree of path dependency. Most of the differences between the new
systems are just a continuation of differences between the previous systems although
they are to solve the same problem and can draw on the same technologies. But most
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astonishing is the finding that these differences between the systems do not influence
diffusion and use of the eID function in the respective countries.
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Similarities and differences between four national eIDMS
In the four countries under comparison, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain,
the eID is the same national ID as collected and administered down the years in
national civil registries, also called population registers. There is a legal obligation in
all four countries for all newborn citizens to be registered. The registries contain data
on several attributes of citizens of the respective state, including name, date of birth,
sex, address, body size, etc. There are additional registries of inhabitants with other
nationalities. Some countries, e.g. Belgium, have introduced special eID cards for
foreigners. However, the comparison in this chapter will exclusively look at the
national eIDMS for citizens who at the same time are inhabitants of the respective
country and will compare smart cards as tokens, the authentication process, the
infrastructure for distribution, personalisation and activation of the eIDs as well as
the kind of support provided for installing the necessary technical components and
any provider-related procedures in the four countries.
Chipcards as tokens
Tokens for national eIDs can either be pieces of software or hardware. The four
countries under investigation have chosen smart cards in the standard format of
bank and credit cards as hardware tokens (Fig. 1). These cards provide for online
authentication and at least the option of digital signatures. Belgium, Germany and
Spain have finally chosen a newly introduced national electronic ID card, which
is used for visual inspection and as European travel document as well (see lines at
the bottom of Fig. 1). Austria has created a virtual Citizen Card and adopted a
multi-card strategy, indeed a multi-token strategy, as at least for some time the
Austrian eID could have been placed on the SIM card of a mobile phone and on a
USB memory stick as well. The main reason given for the multi-card approach is
that in Austria, in contrast to Belgium and Spain, there is no obligation to hold an
ID card. Rather Austrian citizens can prove their identity with an ID card
(“Personalausweis”), a passport or another official document, e.g. a social
security card or driver’s license, and only 10% have chosen an ID card (see
Aichholzer and Strauß 2010). German citizens are obliged by law to hold either an
ID card (“Personalausweis”) or a passport. German government has chosen the
new electronic ID card as the token for the eID, as more than 90% of German
citizens entitled hold an ID card and are expected to renew it (see Noack and
Kubicek 2010).
Figure 1 shows the front of the four eID cards. Although the Austrian law on
eIDs mentions the national ID card as a possible token, this option so far has not
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been realized. Rather the two smart cards used as tokens are the social security card
(e-card) and bank cards of several Austrian banks. Neither carries a photo of the
holder.
There are also differences regarding the data printed on the front and the rear of
the card. While the Spanish and German cards show the address of the holder, the
Belgian card does not. The address is only stored on the chip, so that the card does
not have to be exchanged when the owner relocates.
In technical terms, the German smart card differs from the other ones by the kind
of chip chosen. While the Austrian, Belgian and Spanish cards use a contact chip,
the German card uses a contactless RFID chip.
Table 1 lists the main differences between the four eID cards.
The authentication process
Authentication in the context of eIDs has been defined as “the corroboration of the
claimed identity of an entity and a set of its observed attributes”. This corroboration
happens in a defined authentication process, which requires possession of the card as
well as knowledge of a PIN code in order to provide for strong authentication,
which is more secure than the weaker authentication via username and password.
The Belgian and the Spanish authentication processes are rather straightforward: if
an online service requires authentication, the citizen puts his eID card into his card
reader and enters his PIN. This starts a dialogue between card reader and client
software on the user´s side with the middleware of the service provider, which
finally corroborates the citizen´s eID via a certificate on the eID card. We called this
a one-sided authentication as the service provider checks the identity of the citizen/
customer, but the citizen/customer cannot corroborate the identity of the service
provider beyond the SSL connection established.
Fig. 1 Tokens for eIDs in Austria, Belgium, Spain and Germany (from left to right)
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In contrast, the German eIDMS employs a double-sided authentication: a service
provider can only get access to the eID data on the card of his customer as
authorized by an access certificate, for which he has to apply to a federal agency.
According to the principle of proportionality the access rights granted cover only the
data which is necessary for the particular service. This may only be a name or in
other cases only the citizen’s age or address (see Noack and Kubicek 2010, for
technical details see Bender et al. 2008). The Austrian virtual Citizen Card does not
contain personal data but only a personal link, which is used to produce sector-
specific PINs for the respective service in each transaction. Thereby the Austrian
eIDMS provides technical means against merging citizens’ data across different
sectors of e-government (see Aichholzer and Strauß 2010).
Table 2 shows the main features of the authentication process in the four
countries.
Distribution, personalisation and activation of eIDs
The systemic character of eID systems stems from a complex infrastructure for
generating eIDs, putting them on tokens, delivering them to the citizens and having
them activated for use in online authentication. Again there are significant
differences between the four countries.
Table 1 Differences between eIDs and eID Cards
BE ES AT GE
Carrier card Identical with national ID card Yes Yes No Yes
Chip Contact/contactless chip Contact Contact Contact RFID
Obligations Obligatory starting from age
of cardholder
Yes, >12 Yes, >14 e-Card yes >0 Yes, >16
Validity Validity of eID (years) 5 5 or 10 Depending on card 6 or 10
Card function Authentication (online) Yes Yes Yes Opt in
Authentication (visual) Yes Yes No Yes
e-signature Opt out Yes Yes Opt in
eID attributes eID data on chip
• Name Yes Yes No Yes
• address Yes Yes No Yes
• date of birth Yes Yes No Yes
National register number Yes Yes No No
Visual data:
• Address No Yes Depending on card Yes
• Owner’s photograph Yes Yes No Yes
PIN protected data for authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unprotected readable data Yes No No No
Biometrics:
• Face No Yes No Yes
• Fingerprints No Yes No Opt in
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In Belgium and Germany the eIDs and the cards are produced centrally and
distributed via the local municipalities. While in Belgium citizens are notified to pick up
their new card when the old one expires, in Germany citizens must obtain a new card
themselves. In both countries they have to pick up the new card at the local registration
office and receive a PIN code separately by mail. In contrast, in Spain cards are
personalised at local police stations, i.e. the eID is placed on pre-produced chip cards
there (see Heichlinger and Gallego 2010). In Austria the distribution process depends
on the kind of card chosen as token (social security or bank card). The cards are sent
by mail and afterwards have to be activated online at a local office of the respective
issuer. However, the personal link, which is put on the card, comes from the Central
Registry (see Aichholzer and Strauß 2010).
There are also differences regarding electronic signatures. In Austria the e-signature
is a constituent part of the Citizens Card concept, as is the case for the Spanish ID
card. In Belgium they are distributed by default and citizens have to opt out if they do
not wish to have one, while in Germany the card only provides the capacity and
citizens have to choose a provider afterwards, register separately and download keys
and certificates (opt in).
In all four cases the component data for the eID comes from a civil registry where
citizens have to register by law and receive a confirming document. When picking
up the eID token they have to authenticate themselves, so their identity is
corroborated by ID documents as well as by visual control. All four processes can
be classified as strong authentication.
Tables 3 and 4 show the main differences between the eID infrastructure in the
four countries.
Installation of eID technology and support
For online authentication in all four cases the user has to install a card reader with
corresponding driver software as well as a piece of client software for the
authentication process, which via a web browser interacts with an eID server on the
side of the provider of the online service.
As card reader driver and eID client originate from different developers and have
to interoperate with different web browsers running on different operating systems,
Table 2 Features of four authentication processes
BE ES AT GE
Possession and knowledge
(card & PIN)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Length of PIN
(no. of digits)
4 8–16 6 6
Changeable by user No Yes Yes Yes
One-/double-sided
authentication










to certified access rights
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one can expect some problems of interoperability. These problems will be magnified
if the user has to buy the components separately. They may be smaller if the issuer of
the eID card provides a package including a card reader, driver and client software.
But problems may still occur if a new browser version or a new operating system is
installed. For these cases, support may be provided by FAQs on a website and/or a
telephone hotline (Table 4).
Provider-related procedures
An additional element of eIDMS is provision for providers of e-government and
e-commerce services, which have been established in Austria and Germany via
technical certificates and in Belgium via a legal application procedure.
Because the Belgian eID includes the National Registry Number which reveals
the date of birth and a code for the sex of the holder, by law it may not be used for
Table 3 Distribution, personalisation and activation of eIDs
BE ES AT GE
One/several tokens = 1 = 1 >1 = 1
Personalisation Central Local Central
(Personal link)
Central







Distribution of PIN Separate by mail Locally Depends on card
issuer
Separate by mail
Activation By default By default Required Required
Source of ID data Central register Central register Central register Local register
Electronic signature
No of CAs 1 >1 1 >1
No of RAs Same for eID Different agencies Different agencies Different agencies




No No Yes Yes
Table 4 Installation of and support for eID Software
BE ES AT GE
Card reader and client Package Separate Separate Package (planned)
Central website for download instructions Yes Yes Yes Not yet decided
Support via:
- FAQs Yes Yes Yes Not yet decided
- eMail Yes Yes Yes
- Telephone Yes Yes Yes
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authentication purposes by non-governmental units. Instead private sector organ-
isations have to get permission from the Privacy Commission for using the ID
number in electronic processes. In Spain, the eID also includes the date of birth and
a code for the sex of the holder, but no legal or technical requirements restrict the use
of the eID card and/or the personal identity number by private-sector organisations.
In Austria, as mentioned before, the virtual Citizen Card only contains an identity link
with a source PIN, which is needed to generate a sector-specific PIN by the Central
Registry of Residents (CRR). Public and private sector organisations have to apply to
the CRR for making use of the citizen card. In Germany, providers of e-government or
e-commerce services have to apply for a certificate granting access only to those data
necessary for providing the respective service. Providers have to put the access
certificate on their eID server, which enters into a dialogue with the eID card. The
Federal Administration Office deals with this certification process and may also
revoke certificates.
To summarize, there are differences with regard to almost every aspect of the eIDMS
between at least two of the four countries. The only common features in all four eIDs are
the size of the cards used as tokens, and the legal obligation to register and to hold an ID
document. This is remarkable as the four countries have been selected according to the
“most similar design” principle. Therefore these differences call for explanation.
A three-fold path dependency
According to our conceptual framework we assume that differences in the design of a
national eIDMS as described in the previous section can be explained by their
predecessors and the deliberate decision of the main actors to either continue this path, to
modify or to break with it, move to another path or create a new one. These path-related
decisions concern the technical components of the eIDMS, the organisational arrange-
ments and the pattern of regulation. Therefore we speak of technological, organisational
and regulatory paths. In our conceptual framework we further assume that the relevant
context conditions have already influenced the predecessor systems, and thereby restrict
the path-related choice and allow for different degrees of discretion. However, creating a
new organisational or regulatory path means establishing new institutions and thereby
changing contextual factors, such as the legal and administrative structure in the
respective country. In this section we will consider the extent to which such changes
happened. In the following section we will examine the interaction system and the main
actors and try to explain why there was path continuation, change or creation.
As this research is exploratory and aims at hypothesis generation rather than
hypothesis testing, we will summarise our findings, interpretations and conclusions
from the four case studies in the form of generalisations. These may be considered as
hypotheses and as Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and will be subject to
tests by comparison with other countries with different basic characteristics of their
national IDMS in the next chapters of this special issue.
As a first rough summary of the four case studies we dare to generalise:
G 1 The decisions taken for most of the organisational arrangements, the
technical components and regulatory patterns of the national eIDMS
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follow established paths. In a few cases new paths had to be created
because there was no predecessor. The creation of a new path only
occurred with regard to privacy protecting measures.
Organisational paths
An eID, as a set of attributes assigned to an entity, is primarily an organisational
innovation and only with regard to the token chosen and the authentication process a
technical innovation as well. To analyse path dependency with regard to organisa-
tional paths, we have to see whether existing institutions are continued and/or
assigned new tasks, whether they have been changed or whether new institutions
have been established, in particular whether
– previous attributes are kept or whether new ones have been added,
– the existing administrative procedures for registration and authentication have
been transposed into the online world or been changed,
– the same organisations which are in charge of the ID are administering the eID.
From the comparison of the four eIDMS we conclude that there is a high degree
of continuation on the organisational path:
G 2.1 With regard to the definition of the eID and the organisational
arrangements for administering eIDs, there is a high degree of path
continuation. The definition of the ID has not been changed, and the eID
is administered by the same institutions as the previous ID documents,
except for Austria and Germany, where some additional procedures have
been established to adhere to privacy requirements, still employing
existing institutions.
Table 5 displays the relevant organisational features of the four eIDMS:
With regard to the definition of the eID, in three of the four countries nothing has
changed. The eID consists of the same attributes and data as the previous national ID.
Countries which previously had a unique personal identity number are using it for the
eID as well; the others did not take the opportunity to introduce one. The only
exception is Austria, which considering the difference between online and offline
authentication introduced sector-specific PINs instead of one uniform eID generated
via a secret personal link, which is provided by the Central Registry. Germany is a
special case with regard to digital fingerprints: they are not part of the eID function
and may not be used for online authentication. They can only be accessed by special
card readers for personal inspection by police or for border control. But including them
on the same eID card as the eID for online authentication had effects on the public and
political debate and the issuing of the new revised ID Card Act.. We classify this as
path merger and not as path creation because the digital fingerprints were already
collected and stored in the RFID chip of the recent new electronic passport. When
defining the data to be stored on the eID card, the passport path was merged with the
eID (card) path, because the eID card serves as a travel document as well.
With regard to administrative procedures there were only a few changes, due to
different technical or regulatory requirements. In all four cases citizens have to register
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and to apply for a new eID card when the old one expires and the ID is taken from the
central civil registries. The only difference is that the eID has to be activated after
receiving the token and that in two countries the PIN is delivered separately by mail.
Only Austria and Germany created a new organisational path by establishing a
registration or certification procedure for access rights. In Spain new technical means
were not considered to afford any organisational change. Instead new technology had
been developed to maintain the existing organisational arrangements: paper-based
identity cards had been personalised by handwriting in the local police stations, and
now electronic machines were developed and installed in hundreds of police stations
which personalise pre-produced eID cards there. The capture of the digital fingerprints
is in line with previous procedures as well. Although they did not show on the
previous card, they did on earlier ones and have for decades been collected and stored
in a central register (see Heichlinger and Gallego 2010).
Technological paths
The term technological path refers to the choice of the token as carrier medium for
the eID-based authentication and to related functions such as electronic signatures
and data protection technology. In those countries which have chosen their national
ID card as token for their eID, this has been done in conjunction with a technical
innovation of the ID document for visual inspection, e.g. police and border control.
Of course the step from a paper-based ID document, even if it has a machine-
readable data zone, to a chip-based card cannot be considered as path continuation.
Nor is continuation possible with regard to the functions of the card, as the eID
function had no predecessor. Therefore technological path constituency does not
refer to the continuity of the old token, but rather to adherence to general trends in
smart card and authentication technology.
G 2.2 Decisions made for most of the technical components of the national eIDMS
follow established paths of smart card and authentication technologies.
Table 6 shows that there was almost no deviation from mainstream chip and PKI
technology in Belgium and Spain, but path creation in Austria and Germany.
According to the Citizen Card concept, on the Austrian cards the Sector-Specific
PIN is generated on the chip requiring a different kind of processor technology
Germany is the only country to employ a RFID chip, but not as new path creation
because of the eID, but because of the travel document function and a corresponding
adoption of the path of the recently introduced electronic passport according to the
ICAO standard. We may also speak of a path merger in this case. It has to be noted
at this point that the other three countries so far have not introduced a new passport
according to this standard, despite a European Directive requiring digital fingerprints
to be included by June 2009 (European Council 2004).
There were two main reasons for choosing an RFID chip in Germany (see Noack
and Kubicek 2010). Considering the 10 year validity of the eID there is the risk that
a contact-related chip at the end of this period may cause problems owing to
abrasion. There is no experience in this regard with any contact-related chip being
used for more than 6 years. Therefore a contactless chip has been chosen which is
not exposed to abrasion. The Belgian eID card also has a validity of up to 10 years,
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but the people in charge of the eID card did not share this concern. On the contrary,
Belgian officials had doubts about the security of RFID chips, which their German
colleagues did not share. The second reason for RFID chips in Germany was brought
forward by the Federal Police: The prevcious ID card was larger than the new one in
ID1 format and showed a larger picture. Federal Police insisted on keeping the size
of the picture on the smaller new card to guarantee for the same conditions for visual
inspection at night or under other unfavourable circumstances. Only if there were no
contact space for a chip on the card, would it be possible to have a picture of the old
size as well as data in a readable format on a smaller card (see Table 1, above).
G 2.3 The choice of technological path continuity, modification or creation
depends on the options available at the point in time when the decision on
technical components was made.
According to our conceptual framework, the technological options available to actors
are assembled in the technological pool. In other words, the technological pool contains
all technologies from existing paths and any new alternative option. Due to technological
progress, the pool is not static but grows over time. Path constituency in this view means
that actors compare a given path with newly available alternatives and compare the
advantages and disadvantages. Therefore the point in time when decisions were taken is
relevant for identifying the options available in the technological pool at that time.
Figure 2 shows the point in time of the development process in relation to relevant
technological innovations and standards. For example the ICAO specification for
biometry on RFID chips was issued in 2003 and the EAC standard for data access to the
electronic passport was issued only in 2006. Therefore the e-passport path was not an
option to be considered when the Belgian or Spanish eID cards were specified.
G 2.4 Once a technical choice has been made and a new path has been created,
this establishes path dependency for the future.
Rollout of the new eID cards has finished in Belgium and will soon be in Spain.
The first exchanges of eID cards have already taken place in Belgium in 2009, and
Fig. 2 eID development processes in relation to relevant technological innovations
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both countries will have to exchange the eID cards in 2014 and 2016 respectively.
As the specification and preparation for mass production of new processor chip cards
takes about 5 years, considerations on path continuity or path modification have to
be made right now.
In Belgium there is a discussion to integrate the SIS card with the eID card via the
authentication function, but this has not been finally decided yet. There is no
intention to change the token, the process or the infrastructure. In Spain and Austria
there is no discussion to change the eIDMS at all. Perhaps there will be minor
improvements regarding security requirements, but the eIDMS established now seem
to achieve a high degree of path persistence — even at the risk that the new eID card
may not be used as a travel document outside the Schengen area.
Another indicator of path persistence is the introduction of complementary eID
cards according to the pattern of the primary eID card. In Belgium this is the case for
the Kids Card, which is issued for children under the age of 12 years, but without
e-signature, as well as for the foreigner card for EU-citizens (see Mariën and Van
Audenhove 2010).
Regulatory paths
By regulatory path we mean the legal regulations concerning the obligation to
register and to hold an ID document, to get the authentication functionality, as well
as limitations for employing the authentication function or special certification
requirements. Of course existing legislation has to be adapted if a new kind of
document is introduced. We have already seen that the attributes establishing the eID
do not differ from the previous official ID. In this respect legislation was not
changed. However, there were some new legal provisions and adminstrative
procedures related to the use of the eIDs by providers of online services in
particular for privacy enhancing features (Table 7).
G 2.5 The regulatory patterns concerning the eID are kept quite stable. Existing
legislation has only been adapted to cover the technical and organisational
changes. But in two countries new paths have been created to provide for
appropriate privacy by design.
As already mentioned with regard to the organisational path, the general
obligation to register and to hold an ID document have not been changed nor the
definition of the eID as taken from the civil registry in three of the four
countries. With regard to these basic aspects existing legislation had to be
adapted to refer to the new kind of documents, i.e. the eID card. The only
exemption is Austria, which opened a new regulatory path by issuing an
eGovernment Act. Austria also had adapted the Identity Card Act in 2001 to
allow for the ID card as token for the Citizen card, but so far does not use this
possibility. The Citizen Card and Sector-Specific PINs together with electronic
signatures are regulated in a separate newly created eGovernment Act (see
Aichholzer and Strauß 2010). In the other three countries the planning for a new
technical means has not been considered opening a window of opportunity for the
introduction of general changes in the national IDMS regarding the identity
attributes, registration obligations etc.
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Austria and Germany also enacted particular provisions for privacy preservation
and thus responded to public concerns, i.e. via Sector-Specific PINs in Austria and
the selected access rights to eID data according to certification within a double-sided
authentication process in Germany. We will discuss in section “Legal context,
culture and values” why governments in the four countries differ in this respect.
The interaction system: Relevant policy fields and power structure
In an actor-oriented view, these differences are the outcome of the decisions of
powerful and resourceful policy makers taken in specific contexts and more or less
following established paths (see Scharpf 2000 as well as the introductory paper by
Kubicek 2010). However it is not obvious which actors to start with, because eIDs
are not linked to specific classes of policy actors. From previous descriptive studies
we know that the initiative for the introduction of a national eIDMS arose in the
context of national e-government initiatives and programmes. However, e-
government is not an established policy field. It is directed at the modernization of
public services by introducing or enhancing ICT. As these public services and
processes belong to different established policy fields such as tax, social welfare,
home affairs, environmental affairs, e-government is a transversal effort, which may
be assigned to different ministries and needs coordination in any case. In addition, it
depends on which token is chosen and which other functions this token has to
provide. As governments change over time, and new governments may have
different priorities, the actor constellation also may change in the course of the whole
development process. From the four country reports we also learned that, except for
Spain, the new eID card was not the first choice as the token for the eID function.
In this section therefore we will first assess where within the policy system plans
for an eID function started and which tokens were looked for. Then we will look at
the relevance of different policy fields involved in each national development
process, coordination mechanisms and whether changes in government offices
resulted in any changes of plans for the eIDMS.
Table 7 Regulatory path dependency
Country BE ES AT GE
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E-government as the starting point for national eID initiatives
Being EU Member States, the four countries under comparison share the same
history of decisions taken by their governments at European level. The European
Commission launched the initiative “eEurope 2002” in December 1999 with the aim
of accelerating Europe´s development towards a knowledge-based economy,
including better access for all European citizens to the new services of the
information age. The Council of Ministers at the Feira Summit in June 2002 adopted
the first eEurope 2002 Action Plan, aiming at (1) a cheaper, faster, secure Internet,
(2) investing in people and skills, and (3) stimulating the use of the Internet. Under
the third objective with reference to the Lisbon strategy it was agreed that “Member
States ensure generalised electronic access to main basic public services by 2002/
2003” and “promote the use of electronic signatures within the public sector”. eIDs
and online authentication were not mentioned in this section, but the first objective
included the “availability of cost-effective smart card solutions to enable secure
electronic transactions by 2002” (Council of the European Union 2000).
For all of the objectives, regular measurement of achievements was agreed upon.
The first benchmarking report was submitted in 2002 (European Commission 2002).
For progress of e-government a special annual benchmarking was commissioned to
Cap Gemini, starting in 2001 referring to the online availability of 20 public
services, 12 addressing citizens and 8 provided for business (see e.g. the 5th report,
Cap Gemini 2005).1
Against this background we found that the policy field of e-government as part of
the field of (the modernisation of) public administration has been the home domain
for eID considerations.
G 3.1 The common starting point for the introduction of eIDs in EU Member
States has been the policy field of e-government, i.e. the modernisation of
public administration by ICT, in particular offering public services via the
Internet: for this purpose stronger methods of authentication than
username and password seemed necessary. The new authentication
methods should be employed for e-government services in all areas and at
all levels of government, national, regional and local, and perhaps also in
e-commerce. The departments of national governments responsible for
e-government initiated processes aiming at the introduction of a unique
eID at national level.
Within the national governments of the four countries, responsibility for
e-government is assigned to different ministries and there are different regulations
or practices involving lower levels of public administration (state, provincial,
regional governments and local municipalities), which are responsible for most of
the services for citizens and business.2
1 For a summary of the eEurope Action Plan 2002 and 2005 and the benchmarking of public services see
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2002/index_en.htm.
2 For details see the e-government Fact Sheets for each country on the epractice portal http://www.
epractice.eu/en/factsheets/
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The first e-government program in Belgium was launched in 1999 and 1 year
later a Federal ICT Manager was appointed to design a common ICT strategy in the
Federal Public administration. In 2001, his function was assigned to the newly
established Federal Department for ICT (Fedict) responsible for developing a
common strategy for eGovernment, promoting and ensuring its uniform and
coherent implementation within Federal Government Departments and Agencies,
while developing cross-government standards, frameworks, projects and services
necessary to deliver the strategy. Fedict is in the political domain of the Ministry for
Enterprise and Simplification. The Minister holds the political responsibility for
overseeing both the work of the Agency for Administrative Simplification and that
of the Fedict. However the responsibility of the Federal Citizens Registry lies with
the Ministry of the Interior.
In Austria e-government activities date back to 1995 when an Information Society
Working Group was set up by Federal Government. In 2000 an initiative “eAustria in
eEurope” was launched to implement the eEurope action plan in Austria. e-government
responsibility shifted from theMinistry of Finance, in charge of ICTat the Federal level,
to a newly established Chief Information Officer (CIO) affiliated to the Federal
Chancellery and an ICT Board for coordinating the federal and the regional level. One
of the main activities of the CIO and the ICT Board was the preparation of a Federal
e-Government Act issued 2004 and the introduction of the Citizen Card.
The first e-government programme in Spain was launched in 1997 to support the
efficient introduction of so-called multimedia services to public administration. In
2000 the Secretary of State for Public Administration was assigned responsibility for
the use of ICT in the public sector and the eID card was included in the plan “Info
XXI Initiative” Responsibility was taken over by the DG Police within the Ministry
of the Interior, but without the necessary budget. In 2004 the new Vice President
assumed political leadership of e-government and provided decisive impulse for the
introduction of the eID card.
Early e-government initiatives in Germany concentrated on electronic signatures,
introduced by the Signature Act of 1997, initiated by the Federal Ministry of
Research and Technology. After elections in 1998 and a reshuffle of ministries, this
responsibility together with the respective unit and people was shifted to the
Ministry of Economics and Technology. The first federal e-Government programme
“Bund Online 2005” was launched in 2000, integrating activities of the Ministry of
Education and Research, the Ministry of Economics and Technology and the
Ministry of the Interior and coordinated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior
(BMI). The BMI in 2005 founded a new unit within the IT department responsible
for ID cards, passports and civil registry, which worked on the new electronic
passport as well as the new electronic identity card and its eID function.
G 3.2 The ID card was not the first choice of token for online authentication.
Either social security or e-signature cards were tried first. The eID cards
came on the agenda only after the first attempts had failed.
When it came to choosing an appropriate token for the eID, a next generation national
ID card was not the first choice. Because of the ten-year validity of national ID cards,
rollout would need quite a long time, i.e. 5 years until only half of the citizens would
possess a new eID function, while the need for providing for more secure online
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transactions in e-government and e-commerce should be met as soon as possible. There
was the choice of creating particular tokens for the eID function or to put it on other
existing or planned cards. In this case other policy fields had to be won for cooperation.
In Belgium and Austria, first attempts were undertaken to place an eID function on a
social security card. In Austria this preference was obvious as there is no obligation to
hold an ID card. In Belgium the preference resulted from considering the possibility of a
fast rollout as well as the recent positive experience of introducing a chip-based health
and social security card (SIS Card). A new social security card can substitute an old one
at a certain point in time for all members, so rollout of a new eID function could be
completed in a few months. However, the eID still should be the national ID from the
civil registry. So there are different legal provisions, different institutions involved,
partly state-owned, partly not, and there was the concern that data on a social security
card should not be exposed to other agencies in government or even e-commerce.
Political actors responsible for social security cards had nothing to win from opting for a
general eID function but rather had to fear that such an add-on could raise opposition
against ongoing projects for new cards and/or new applications. As these attempts failed,
e-government actors had to look for another token.
In Germany, legal and technical e-government experts in government as well
as academia believed for a long time that the e-signature according to German
signature law would provide for strong authentication. Qualified e-signatures are
offered by several certified certification authorities and can be placed on special
signature cards or on bank cards. However, as the certificate only contains the
name of the holder, there is no unique identifier and another token had to be
found. For a short time the idea of an integrated health and ID card was pursued,
but then the planned renewal of the existing ID card by an eID card was chosen
as a window of opportunity.
For Austria it is interesting to note that when after several delays in 2005 the
electronic social security card (e-card) was finally launched, it was employed as
another token besides the bankcards and today is the most widely used token.
So, in Belgium and Austria there was a preference for the social security card as
eID token, although at first it was not available. Austria choose bank cards and had
some experiments with SIM cards, Belgium took the opportunity of a pending
transition from a paper-based card to a smart card to add an eID authentication
function. Germany had started with e-signature cards, while only Spain moved
directly to a national ID card. By choosing this particular token, requirements
regarding the security of the token and for other functions had to be considered in all
three countries, but gained quite different degrees of influence.
The relevance and power distribution between different policy fields
If a national ID card is chosen as token for an eID function and if this card is
employed for visual inspection by police and at border control, these functions pose
additional, even conflicting requirements, and compromises have to be reached
between different actors.
G 3.3 When choosing an existing token for an eID, actors from the respective
policy fields have to cooperate. They make their own claims regarding
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attributes and procedures and thereby increase the complexity of the
innovation process. The e-government actors did not always have the
greatest power to influence the design of the token.
In the interviews, experts were asked to assess the influence of the different policy
fields and of actors representing these fields. The research teams in the four countries
summarised these estimates on a three-point scale (Table 8).
In all four countries the initiative for a stronger eID-based online authentication
function arose in the e-government context, and the first announcements were made in
e-government programmes by the respective national governments. However, in Spain
and Germany, because the national ID card was chosen as token, the units responsible
for ID cards took over leadership, reducing the influence of the e-government actors to
an influence of 2 points instead of 3 in Belgium and Austria, with a higher influence
(3 instead of 2 points) of the actors in the field of public safety/police. Although
Belgium also chose its new national ID card as token, there were no claims from
another policy fields, so the eID project could remain a single policy field innovation.
Interview partners in Belgium explicitly stated that no party addressed either the issue
of the security of the new card or brought forward any concerns of public safety.
Biometry was deliberately kept out in order to avoid delays and provide the online
authentication function as soon as possible.
Again the point in time, when decisions are made, and path persistence, play an
important role: Without any doubt September 11, 2001, changed the political
importance of public safety, including the security of ID documents in order to fight
terrorism. But not all countries reacted in the same way, and in some countries
relevant decisions had been taken before this event, while in other countries decisions
have been made later taking into account the shift of political priorities. In Belgium the
preparation process for the new eID card, however, had started before September 11,
2001, and nobody wanted to complicate this process by introducing additional
requirements. In contrast to Germany, there was no legislative reaction to September
11, 2001, at all in Belgium and thus there was no other policy field to be linked with.
In Spain the initiative for an eID was started in the Ministry for Public
Administration. But once the ID card had been chosen as a token, the governance
of the process was completely taken over by the Director General of the Police in the
Ministry of the Interior, which had been responsible for issuing all previous ID cards,
but did not have the necessary budget. In Spain, IT infrastructure for government is
Table 8 Influence of actors from different policy fields on the eIDMS development
Actors from policy field BE ES AT GE
Public safety/police 1 3 1 3
Public administration 3 2 3 2
Industry/commerce 1 2 1 1
Finance 1 1 1 1
Social/health 2 1 2 1
Chancellery/cabinet 1 2 3 1
Actors and their influence in the development process (1=low, 3 = high)
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financed and managed by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, aiming at
offering the eID function to public utilities and e-commerce as well.
In Austria, the eID function remained in the policy field of e-government, but
responsibility shifted as the whole field was reassigned from the Ministry of Finance
to the Chancellery.
In Germany after September 11, 2001, the option for biometric features on the
national ID card had immediately been introduced in the Identity Card Act. This option
has been taken up again 4 years later and raised some political controversies we will
discuss in more detail later on. The eID function has only been specified in detail in 2008
when the final version of the law on eID cards had to be drafted and became optional.
To summarise these different assignments and influences we can say:
Spain and Belgium have placed an eID function on a new eID card. Austria has not
decided for a particular token, but the e-card now emerges as the main carrier. Germany
is introducing a new eID card, which offers the option for an eID authentication
function.
Intragovernmental coordination
If several ministries and other units are involved, the success of an innovation
process largely depends on the coordination mechanisms employed.
The initiatives for national eIDMS emerged from national e-government programmes
and plans. But e-government is not an established policy field with a clear assignment to
one of the traditional ministries. It has some affiliation to the domain of ministries of the
interior or home office, which are in charge of public administration and public
employees, but there are also IT-related tasks as well as e-commerce and Internet-related
topics. Most of the e-government programmes are the outcome of interdepartmental
boards or working groups, which also may recommend the development of a national
eIDMS, but do not have the authority and the budgetary power to start such a process.
Rather other more powerful actors within the relevant ministries have to be involved
and reach consensus about the function and the token, financial resources, legislative
action etc. In all cases, legislative action was required and had to be agreed upon
between the ministries and with the majority parties in parliament.
The duration of the consensus-building part of the whole process and the degree
to which e-government-related requirements can be implemented largely depends on
the coordination or integration provisions, which were already there or have been
established for this process.
The importance of intragovernmental coordination had not been foreseen when
developing the conceptual framework. But as we are conducting exploratory
research aiming at generating grounded theory, additional conceptual elements
may well be introduced along with empirical findings. There are a few theories about
the role of champions in innovation processes. Already in 1973, Witte proposed a
variation of such a view assuming that in successful intra-organisational innovation
processes one would frequently find a tandem of a power and an expert promoter.
His case was the employment of mainframe computers in companies in the late
1960s. With regard to duration and outcome, successful processes showed a
powerful actor in top management teamed with an acknowledged IT expert on a
lower hierarchical level (Witte 1973), i.e. power and expertise formed a synergy.
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With regard to general coordination mechanisms, we can distinguish hierarchy
from networks or clans (Ouchi 1980). An alternative to the dual promoter hypothesis
of Witte is the existence of a clan of actors in the organisations concerned. A “clan”
according to Ouchi is a group of people with similar background, interests and
objectives, who share certain values and visions and coordinate their activities
independent of formal organisational affiliations and boundaries.
G 3.4 The duration of the development process depends on the coordination
mechanism employed. Either a couple consisting of a power and an expert
promoter or a clan of (public) managers involved can contribute to speed
up the process, while the lack of such mechanisms leads to delays.
In Austria, CIO Posch can be viewed as expert promoter with power derived from
Chancellor Schüssel. In Spain there was a delay until the new vice-president took
over leadership. In Belgium, there was a long stability of a group of actors who
might be called a “clan” in the most positive sense: Frank Robben (Head CBSS),
Luc Vanneste (Central Register FOD IBZ), Bart Preneel as well as Jos Dumarties
(University of Leuven) had been nominated members of the commission to develop
an e-government policy in 1999, and from different positions in different ministries
prepared all the decisions for the eID function and the eID card. In Germany, there
was no need for intra-governmental coordination as the different areas concerned
were all within the domain of the Ministry of the Interior. However, there was some
kind of a clan including the head of the newly created Unit for Passports, Personal
ID and Civil Registry, the head of the responsible department within the Federal
Office for IT Security and the director of the Federal Printing Office, which is to
print and personalise the eID card. At least from 2006 onwards, the three men
cooperated intensively based on shared basic values and interests.
Political power structure: Ruling parties and changes in government
The different weighting of modernisation of public services vs. public safety and police
issues might be explained by differences between ruling parties. Similarly some of the
differences between the national eIDMS and most of the cases of path creation are
related to privacy concerns, which may be due to different priorities of the ruling
political parties. The likelihood that a change in government due to elections will change
the plans for an eID and an eID card is expected to be lower if existing paths are
followed. The same is true with regard to the relation between governmental units
planning the system and preparing legislation on one side and the parliamentary factions
on the other.
G 3.5 If governments propose an eIDMS, which follows established
technological, organisational and regulatory paths, it is unlikely that there
will be dissent by the majority faction(s) in parliament. In cases of path
creation there will be no dissent either as long as the new paths are in line
with the values held by the majority faction(s).
In Belgium, Spain and Austria there was no dissent between the government and
the ruling parties in parliament. In Belgium the consent of the privacy commission
was sufficient for not entering a larger parliamentary debate. In Spain nobody dared
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to question the authority of the police directorate. In Austria a new path was created
with complicated regulations on public and private keys as well as sector-specific
PINs and laid down in the E-Government Act. As this had been elaborated in the
Chancellery and agreed upon by the ICT board, it did not raise any general concerns
in parliament, nor was there a controversial public debate in the media either. The
whole issue had been considered to be of relevance and interest for IT specialists
only. The project managers in Austria and Belgium confirmed that neither security
concerns after September 11th nor privacy concerns were addressed when they
presented their concepts for the national eIDMS to parliamentary bodies, because
they deliberately had not linked the eIDMS to issues of public safety and terrorism
and could refer to the consent of the privacy authorities.
In Germany the Social Democratic faction in parliament did not dissent to the
newly created path of the eID function for online authentication but—to the surprise
to the governmental actors—did not accept the proposed mandatory inclusion of
digital fingerprints on the eID card. This option had been incorporated in the ID
Card Act immediately after September 11th within a package law against terrorism.
This package had been launched by the Minister of the Interior from the Social
Democratic Party within a coalition government with the Green Party. There were
some concerns in both parliamentary parties about the right balance between security
and privacy, but nobody dared to oppose in this situation as the plans for the attack
had been prepared in Germany. However, when 8 years later the draft bill on the new
eID card was submitted and provided the details for the already announced inclusion
of digital fingerprints, the Social Democrats in Parliament did not feel bound to this
former decision. Meanwhile there was a newly elected Parliament and the new bill
came from a minister of the Christian Democratic Party. Although in a coalition
government with the Christian Democratic Party, the Social Democrats opposed the
mandatory inclusion of digital fingerprints. Their concern was not only that checking
fingerprints is associated with criminals. In addition, it is the specific historical
memory that the National Socialist government under Adolf Hitler had collected
fingerprints to identify Jews (see the German case study by Noack and Kubicek
2010).
Leading Social Democrats did not believe the Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang
Schäuble, that the fingerprints would only be stored on the chip and the data
collected would be deleted immediately after personalisation, as he already had
introduced several extensions of surveillance. This opposition from the coalition
partner was a surprise to the minister and his staff as the inclusion of a biometric
photo and digital fingerprints in the electronic passport had not caused any lasting
opposition. They thought that with the eID card they would only continue this path.
But the Social Democrats perceived some basic differences. As US government by
now required digital fingerprints to be stored on passports, such a passport would
provide greater convenience for Germans travelling to the US. In addition there was
also an ICAO standard for passports as well as the expectation that all other EU
Member States would follow.
Its convenience could be presented as an advantage of the eID card, if it can serve
as a travel document for many countries as well. From a constitutional point of view,
however, a passport is not mandatory in Germany. Citizens have to hold either a
passport or an ID card. As the fingerprints were made mandatory for the passport
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already, an obligation to include fingerprints on the eID card would have forced
every citizen above 16 years of age without exemption to give their fingerprints.
This was perceived as a disproportional infringement of personal freedom. The
compromise agreed upon was that the inclusion of digital fingerprints will be
optional: If a citizen wants to use his eID card as a travel document to be accepted
by states that are checking biometrics at their border, they can opt in.
The German case to some extent shows that there are differences between
political parties with regard to their priorities if there is a conflict between public
safety and privacy. But this did not concern the eID function but other functions of
the token and it was an exception without parallel in the other countries due to a
particular historic background.
G 3.6 Traditional stereotypes according to which conservative parties give
higher priority to public safety features while socialist, social democratic
and liberal governments are more inclined to prioritise privacy
requirements and provisions do not apply to these cases. Accordingly
changes in government did not affect the plans for a new eIDMS.
One might expect that conservative governments give higher priority to public safety
features while socialist, social democratic and liberal governments are more inclined to
privacy saving provisions. However, this stereotype did no show in the case of Austria,
Belgium and Spain at all and only with regard to the finger print issue just mentioned in
Germany. Rather the contrary can be observed in some cases.
Austria experienced a coalition government of the two biggest parties, the Social
Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the conservative ÖVP from 1990 until 1999 and a
change towards a conservative coalition (ÖVP and FPÖ) in 2000. The conservative
government did not take the opportunity to introduce an obligatory ID card to
improve public safety, rather just the same as the left Belgian government started
from the field of e-government and did not link this to public safety. The change to
another coalition government between SPÖ and ÖVP in 2006 brought back the
Social Democrats into office. There was a review due of the e-government law,
which raised some discussion but in the end did not lead to any significant change.
Belgium in 1999 changed from a conservative-left coalition (CVP/PSC and PS/
SP) to a liberal-left coalition (VLP/PRL/FDF and PS/SP), which opened for the start
of an eID initiative. In line with liberal and left politics, the modernisation of public
administration became the inclusive objective. Public safety by identity control was
not taken into account. But privacy-preserving features were not pursued either.
In Spain, a conservative government ruled from 1996 to 2004. Accordingly,
public safety was the dominant policy field and the police directorate was the
dominant actor. However, due to a lack of intra-governmental coordination of
funding, the implementation was delayed and finally started by a mid-left
government (PSOE) after the election in 2004.
In Germany, there was a left-green coalition from 1998, followed by a great coalition
(SPD and CDU) since 2005. In contrast to the general assumption, it was a social
democratic minister who put the eIDMS in the context of public safety and the fight
against terrorism, while e-government was given much less attention. It is less surprising
that his follower in office from the conservative CDU continued with this path.
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The Influence of the IT component and e-commerce industry
Another stereotype is that the IT industry tries to influence government decisions on
technology-related public procurement. Before going deeper into this, we need to
distinguish between the IT industry in a more narrow sense, which produces and
provides components for the eIDMS, in particular smart cards, client and
middleware software, and the e-commerce industry which may apply eID-based
authentication procedures.
Such an influence of the IT industry in the more narrow sense has been analyzed
in particular for IT systems in military institutions, but also for large legacy systems
in public administration. Against this background, one might expect that large
national IT companies had tried to influence the design of the national eIDMS. From
the case studies, however, we may summarize:
G 3.7 The smart card industry tries to get involved in the specification of chip
cards in order to be prepared for the design and production of eID chips,
but accepts the functional specification based on political preferences.
They also try to adhere to or even establish international standards in
order to open for other markets, but do not fight for this goal.
The smart card industry did not have a specific interest in particular attributes of
an eID, but certainly has an interest to increase their returns on investment and to sell
the components developed for their home market to other countries as well. For this
purpose they either want the components to adhere to existing international
standards or to establish newly developed components or procedures as an
international standard.
This is most plausible with regard to chip producers. This industry, according to
an expert interview, can be described as follows3:
There are four different product markets: chips for GSM/SIM cards, bank cards,
public sector cards and pay TV decoder cards. National public sector chip cards
include ID cards, passports, health and social security cards as well as public
transport cards. For each application, chips have to be developed individually and a
special production process has to be set up. The time span from a first idea to the
start of mass production takes about 5 years.
There is a European Standard for a citizen card developed by CEN, but it has not
been made obligatory by the European Commission. In fact, none of the tokens in
the four eIDMS systems under investigation fully adheres to this standard. In
Europe, there are eight different eID chips according to different national require-
ments. This shows that chip manufacturers did not succeed in influencing the design
of an eID token in order to allow for transfer into other countries.
Most of the big multinational chip producers know and accept the role of national
governments in defining requirements due to political preferences. The market in big
countries such as Germany and Spain is by far large enough to pay off the
development cost. Thus, in the four countries under investigation experts from the
smart card industry tried to get involved in preparatory working groups, but did not
try to influence the design decision.
3 Expert interview with Dr. Detlef Houdeau, Infinion, Germany
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A dialogue with the smart card industry might reduce uncertainty of technical
choices. But without their own expertise, government may not be able to evaluate
the recommendations by industry experts. Therefore they involve their own experts
and leave it to them to include representatives from industry.
G 3.8 National governments have their own organisations with expertise on IT
security, cryptology etc. and leave technical specifications to them.
Depending on the existence of a national smart card industry, it is up to
these organizations to enter into a dialogue with this industry.
Policy makers in government planning for a technically secure eIDMS need to build
on technical expertise. In each country there is at least one state-owned organisation
with expert knowledge in IT security and in particular cryptography. In Belgium, Fedict
took the lead in technical specification and cooperated with ZETES, the card producer,
and computer scientists from the University of Leuven. ZETES has extensive
experience in the manufacturing of digital cards (e.g. SIS-card, bank cards).
In Spain the IT department of the police directorate together with the national Centre
for Cryptology in the Ministry of Defence has led the specification. Consultants from IT
industry were involved but did not influence the decisions taken.
As the Citizen Card in Austria is not bound to a particular token, there was no
opportunity for chip manufacturers to get involved. The software architecture for the
virtual Citizen Card and the sector-specific PIN was developed by computer
scientists from the University of Graz.
In 2004, in Germany a working group “DIF ID Cards” (Deutsches Industrie Forum =
German Industry Forum ID Cards) has been set up with Siemens, T-Systems and the
Government Printing Office under the guidance of the Federal Office for IT Security to
prepare for the specification of the eID card. The Federal Ministry of the Interior let the
group know that Germany should have its own specification and should try to establish a
European standard, which might compete with a French standard.
This strategy was successful with regard to electronic passports (EAC), but not with
regard to the eID card, as several countries already had started their development
processes in 2004. Furthermore, a changeover of the second generation of eID cards of
Belgium or other countries to the German path was and still is very unlikely.
There is quite a different picture regarding the role of the e-commerce industry.
E-commerce faces similar security risks due to weak authentication methods as
e-government. Therefore one could expect their interest in participating in any
development of stronger authentication methods at national level. At the same time
governments can be expected to have an interest in getting e-commerce industry
involved, as e-government services alone do not create the critical mass to motivate
citizens to adopt new authentication methods. However, so far private sector
companies in many countries have only limited access to ID data of citizens as kept
in civil registers. Although in some countries, hotels ask for the handing out of an ID
card or banks ask for the presentation of an ID card for opening an account, the data
on the card usually is not filed by private entities.
Against this background, the question is whether the eIDMS shall be open to
e-commerce service providers in general or only under certain conditions and also
whether they should be invited to participate in the development process. If not,
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these providers and their associations may raise their voices and put demands into
the arena. In both cases we can expect an increased complexity of the eIDMS itself
and the regulation as well as increased coordination requirements in the process.
The situation in the four countries under investigation can be summarised as follows
G 3.9 The e-commerce industry and banks showed little interest during the
development processes and did not try to influence the technical design
nor the regulation of the eID function and the authentication process.
Belgian banks did not show any interest in the strong authentication to be
provided by the eID function of the Belgian Personal Identity Card (BelPIC) during
the development process. To them a bankcard serves as a credit or debit card
connected with an authentication function. Several banks offer an offline TAN-
generator or a similar device which serves as a reader for their bankcards. Their
cards carry the brand of the bank, and the technology ties the customer to “his” bank.
Therefore an eID card does not promise any advantage. When the rollout of the new
card started, the e-commerce industry showed some interest in the eID-based
authentication function.However, Belgian privacy law puts restrictions on the use of
the unique National Registry Number (RNN) as part of the eID because it reveals the
date of birth and the sex of the holder and it could therefore be used for targeted
advertising. Private enterprises that want to use the RNN have to get permission by
the privacy commission. So far the commission did not give permission for the use
of online authentication via BelPIC. Agoria, an association of IT companies, has for
some time discussed different normative or technical options for reducing privacy
infringements. A normative approach would be a code of conduct to be adopted by
e-commerce providers, technical solutions would either employ encryption of the ID
number or the translation into a non-speaking ID.4 The Belgian e-commerce
industry, however, did not actively lobby during the development process, neither for
a technical solution nor for changing the legal restriction after the introduction of the
new eID card. It supported the marketing activities of the Belgian government as
part of their intiatives for a more secure Internet.
In Spain the existing ID card and the personal identity code are heavily used in
everyday life. There has been no discussion about restricting the use of the new eID
card. The Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Commerce, which provided most of the
funding for the eIDMS, did neither explicitly address this issue in the beginning nor
officially consult the IT or Internet industry. As late as 2008, it launched a
programme to support applications in e-commerce. So there was neither any
influence on the design of the eIDMS nor on the development process.
In Austria, the cooperation of banks, some of them state-owned, was sought by
government when the e-card option had failed, and bankcards were considered an
appropriate token for the virtual eID card. Bank officials had not been invited to
participate in the concept development and specification. Rather they had to accept
the political pressure to adopt the citizen card. Most Austrian banks agreed and
offered the implementation of the Citizen Card on their branded bankcard. But as the
4 Such a transformation has been employed in Finland. See the case study by Rissanen (2010) in this
issue.
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function was too complex and not accepted by their customers, recently they started
leaving this path, e.g. by no longer promoting the citizen card function for newly
edited bankcards.
Germany to some extent is an exception from this generalisation: the eID-based
authentication function has been conceived for the adoption in e-government and
e-commerce from the beginning. In order to adhere to the proportionality criteria of
privacy regulation and to meet security concerns of citizens/consumers regarding
phishing and other forms of identity theft, the double-sided process of authentication
with access certificates has been developed and laid down in the respective
legislation. In so far the opening for e-commerce application led to a more complex
eIDMS. However this did not influence the development process at all. E-commerce
industry and banks have not been invited into the DIF working group. After
specification, the eIDMS has been selected as one of the few projects, which became
the subject of the annual national IT summit organised by the German Chancellery.
Ebay Germany has taken formal leadership of the respective working group. There is
also support for the project by BITKOM, the national IT industry association. But to
our knowledge, there was no influence on the design of the eID function or on the
eID card. German banks showed only limited interest in the eID-based authentica-
tion function so far.
In summary, the basic assumption in the conceptual framework is that differences in
the eIDMS may be explained by differences between the interaction systems, i.e.
between the instutional actors who make the choices of path continuation, change or
creation. The interaction system in the four countries shows a high degree of variance
with regard to the affiliation of main actors, their roles, interests, resources and
strategies. The focus point to map these differences is the dominating policy field, which
takes leadership of the development process, and the respective actors from the policy
fields of modernisation of public sercives vs. public safety. This, in turn, depends only to
a small extent on the political power structure, i.e. the values and ideologies of the ruling
political parties and to an even lesser degree on actors from IT industry. Where a path
creation has happened, it was related to privacy-preserving measures, with which policy
makers reacted to concerns in their respective country.
Legal context, culture and values
In two of the four countries under comparison new paths have been created mainly
because of privacy concerns: Austria created the Sector-Specific Pin and Germany
introduced the selective access to eID data according to the certified proportionality
requirements, while Belgium continued the legal restrictions of the use of the registry
number and Spain did not take any action with regard to privacy. According to our
conceptual framework, policy-makers act within a certain context including legal and
cultural factors. Differences with regard to privacy-enhancing components of the
eIDMS therefore might be explained by different privacy legislation and culture.
A second line of differences has been observed with regard to the degree to which
government provides additional and supportive services, subsidises the prices for the
eID function and promotes the adoption of stronger authentication on the service
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provider side. This may be because of differences in the general understanding what
services governments should provide and what should be left to the private sector
and market-related competition, for which we use the German term “Staatsver-
ständnis”, as we could not find an appropriate English term.
Privacy legislation and culture
The development of the four eIDMS under investigation in this research took place
under national privacy legislation, which has to adhere to the European Data
Protection Directive of 1995 (European Council 1995). Therefore there should be no
great differences in the general privacy legislation between the four countries. But a
closer look at the legislative process and the role the national privacy enforcing
authorities have played shows that there are differences. There are at least some
indications that these general differences are related to the degree of privacy-
enhancing elements of the eIDMS.
G 4.1 Countries with a stronger privacy governance in general also have
established stronger privacy-preserving measures in their national eIDMS.
However, differences between general privacy governance explain less than
differences between the application of privacy provisions in related areas.
In Austria, Belgium and Germany there was no doubt that because the eIDMS
concerns basic privacy rights, precise legal regulation is required. In Spain the
Ministry of the Interior took the view that no additional data is collected compared to
the previous ID card and the long-established filing of fingerprints in a central
database is only extended to the new eID card and therefore no parliamentary
consent was required. While Austria and Germany designed technical privacy-
enhancing measures, Belgium kept the limitations of the use of the National Registry
Number for the eID. If we consider the technical measures to be stronger than the
legal restrictions, we can rank the four countries according to the degree of privacy-
preserving measures as shown in the first line of Table 9.
To assess the strength of general privacy governance in the four countries, we
may use three indicators:
(1) If the legal provisions of the eIDMS have to be established by a law, which has
to pass parliaments, privacy governance is stronger compared to decrees or
directives, which can be issued by government agencies without parliamentary
consent.
(2) If the government agencies developing the eIDMS have to get formal
agreement by the privacy authority and/or if this consent has to be declared
to the legislator, privacy governance is stronger than the obligation for formal
consultation or even informal consultation.
(3) If the privacy authority has to grant ex ante permission for using ID data by
governments and private business, governance is stronger than ex post control
of compliance to privacy regulations.
If we apply these three indicators to the four countries, Belgium ranks highest,
followed by Austria, Germany and Spain (Table 9).
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According to article 28 of the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), Member
States shall provide that one or more public authorities are responsible for
monitoring the application of the provisions according to this directive. They shall
operate with complete independence. These supervisory authorities have to be
consulted “when drawing up administrative measures and regulations relating to the
protection of individual rights and freedom with regard to the processing of personal
data”.
Member States have adopted this provision differently in their national law. The
German Federal Data Protection Law does not contain this obligation to consult the
Data Protection Officer in a legislative process at all but gives him the right to
address Federal Parliament. As the Austrian Privacy Commission is affiliated to the
Chancellery, its independence is questioned by some observers.
In 2007, the non-governmental organisation Privacy International published a
National Privacy Ranking considering such general aspects as well as the provisions
or agreement to communication interception, access to medical data and other
aspects based on the assessment of national correspondents. Table 10 shows the
values for these indicators for the four countries under comparison.
The index of “privacy enforcement” summarizes answers of national experts to
two questions:
* Is there a regulatory body with sufficient powers to investigate privacy
infractions? Can this regulator act proactively?
* Does this regulator act in an effective way? Have cases been taken through the
administrative and legal systems?
According to PI experts, Belgium, Spain and Germany rank highest with a value
of 4,0 standing for “Significant protections and safeguards”, while Austria only gets
2,0 points indicating “Systemic failure to uphold safeguards” (Privacy International
2007).
Table 9 Degree of privacy-preserving measures in eIDMS and the general privacy governance
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The overall index values in the bottom line include assessments of privacy
enactment in different areas, again with Germany and Belgium evaluated quite good
and showing very poor values for Austria and Spain.
Reasons given for the poor Austrian assessment include: “e-identity management
system is heavily criticised, ... legal requirement permitting Austrian military to
request subscriber data from telecommunications providers, ... centralisation of data
on students that is stored for 60 years.” And the indications for Spain include:
“Several interception scandals over the years; including extensive access to
communications without court order, laws for preventing funding of terrorism have
been applied to other crimes, lack of debate around introduction of planned
electronic ID card, retention period for 12 months, and plan to ban anonymous pre-
paid mobile phones.”
In a similar way, we may compare provisions in the area of civil registration,
which at least may be considered as threats to privacy, such as the principle of “one
authentic source” as compared to informational power sharing, a unique personal
identifier and a central data base for digital fingerprints (Table 11).
According to these indicators, Belgium and Spain have each granted two privacy-
critical provisions, while Austria and Germany did not take any of these risks. For
the same reasons policy-makers in both countries may have taken privacy-preserving
measures within their eIDMS. But we can not explain the difference between
Belgium and Spain.
From these exercises, we may conclude that different indicators for legal privacy-
preserving and enforcing mechanisms and their application in different areas do not
show a consistent picture. While Germany is always ranked quite high and Spain
ranked lowest, the ranking of Belgium varies a little bit and the one for Austria
varies extremely. This may be due to the somewhat fuzzy assessment method of
Privacy International and their reliance on national experts, which may apply
different yardsticks.
Table 11 Granted threats to privacy in the area of civil registration and ID management
Granted threats to privacy BE ES AT GE
(1) “One authentic source” instead of informational power separation Yes No No No
(2) Unique personal identifier Yes Yes No No
(3) Digital fingerprints data base No Yes No No
No. of granted threats 2 2 0 0
Privacy protecting level Rank 2 Rank 2 Rank 1 Rank 1
Table 10 Privacy International (PI) ranking
Privacy International surveillance indices BE ES AT GE
Privacy enforcement 4.0 4.0 2.0 4.0
Surveillance Index of PI 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.8
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In our conceptual framework, we assume that policy-makers make their choices
on path continuation or creation of new paths within a legal context, but as elected
politicians also care for the concerns of their constituency. If they expect privacy
concerns to be raised by the planned eIDMS, they will take care of privacy-
enhancing provisions. Therefore, besides the comparison of the legal environment,
we have to look at differences with regard to the privacy culture between the four
countries under study.
G 4.2 Policy makers in Austria and Germany took stronger privacy-preserving
measures than their colleagues in Belgium and Spain because of a a more
sceptical and demanding privacy culture, which is indicated by survey
data.
In June 2006, Backhouse and Halperin conducted an online survey with almost
2,000 respondents in 23 EU Member States (Germany 1,200, Austria 34, Spain 33,
Belgium 26). The results are not published by country but by country groups,
Austria, Germany and Scandinavia as one group, Benelux and France as a second
group, South Europe another (Table 12).
Although the number of respondents is much too low to allow for any valid
comparison, we may pose the hypothesis that citizens in Germany and Austria are
more sceptical than people in Benelux States and that citizens in Southern Europe
are even less concerned (cf. Backhouse and Halperin 2009 and the FIDIS homepage
at www.fidis.net for more data). This ranking corresponds with the strengths of the
privacy-enhancing measures taken in these countries as indicated in Table 9.
These data are in line with the more comprehensive data provided by the
Eurobarometer survey no. 225 on data protection and the perception of European
citizens (Gallup Organisation 2008), from which the authors conclude:
“Austrian and German citizens seemed to be the most concerned about how
their personal data was handled. Eighty-six percent of those respondents
reported being concerned about data privacy issues, and two-thirds claimed to
be very concerned (Austria 70%, Germany 65%).”(p.7)
The data for all four countries are display in Table 13, line (3). The same
difference can be found for “citizens´ trust in privacy at public agencies” (line (1)
Table 13). However, for other related items, the four countries to some extent show a
Table 12 Trust in privacy of exchange of ID data (Backhouse and Halperin 2009, pp. 258)
AT/GE, Scan. Benelux South Europe
I believe that ID authorities will be truthful and
honest when dealing with my data.
5.6 4.8 4.5
I believe my interests will be represented in deciding
how ID data will be exchanged.
5.9 5.3 4.9
I feel comfortable for my ID data to be shared
- across government institutions 5.3 5.0 4.2
- between government and businesses. 6.6 6.1 5.9
1 = strong agreement; 7 = strong disagreement
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different ranking. With regard to the level of privacy protection in their country,
Belgian and Austrian citizens are more satisfied than the German and Spanish
respondents, which does not explain the stronger efforts in Austria compared with
Spain. Similarly concerns about personal data protection in the Internet are slightly
greater in Belgium and Spain while Austria and Germany took stronger action.
Stronger privacy concerns call for stronger measures, but do not tell what kind of
measures are most appropriate. Austria and Germany employed technical measures
to meet the privacy concerns of citizens, but they have addressed different kinds of
concerns and chosen different measures accordingly. Austria addressed the concern
for linking data across administrative boundaries, while Germany wanted to provide
for compliance with the principle of proportionality, i.e. that service providers can
get access only to those ID data which are necessary for authentication for a
particular service. When looking for technical solutions actors leaned on existing
organisational principles and implemented them into technical features.
G 4.3 The privacy-preserving measures are chosen on established paths of
privacy arrangements in the ID environment.
The introduction of sector-specific PINs in the Austrian virtual Citizen Card
concept followed the existing structure of 26 sectors in the data protection registry,
where public entities and businesses have to register electronic files containing
personal data. They were introduced for implementing the purpose-binding principle
when the central civil register was established and were applied for the Citizen Card
concept as well.
The German requirement for restricted and selected access to the eID data on the
chip according to the requirements of the respective service is simply the application
of existing privacy legislation and legislative tradition. German privacy law requires
that public entities may only collect personal data necessary for a concrete purpose
and that this data is defined in a specific law regulating this service. This is the case
for hundreds of public services and laid down in respective laws and directives,
including the old ID Card Act. Regulation of authentication for online access to
public services in the revised eID Card Act has just been handled in this tradition
drafted by a lawyer within the Federal Ministry of the Interior, who has been
“borrowed” from the data protection authority of the federal state of Schleswig-
Holstein. Being involved in research on user-centric identity management before, the
Table 13 Selected data from Eurobarometer no. 225 (Gallup Organisation 2008)
Privacy concerns BE ES AT GE
(1) Trust government agencies (social security,
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creative part was to carry the legal requirements into technical functionality.
Although it produces some additional administrative burden, this regulation provides
an answer to the security and privacy concerns of citizens and therefore could be
justified very well in the legislative process. Indeed the experts interviewed
confirmed that this regulation has not been questioned at any time by any participant
in the legislative process.
“Staatsverständnis”: Opt in or opt out
The four eIDMS under comparison also differ with regard to the modus of the
authentication and the e-signature function, whether they are mandatory or optional
with an opt-in or and opt-out choice. These differences may be explained by the
respective understanding of policy makers which services should be provided or at
least regulated by the state and what should be left to private business. Of course
different political parties have different views on this, and citizens have different
expectations as well. In Germany, this basic belief concerning the extent to which
the state intervenes in societal processes and in particular business is called
“Staatsverständnis”. As we did not find an appropriate English translation, we use
this term here, which might roughly be translated with “the accepted or expected
level of state intervention”. But our case studies do not corroborate this assumption
completely:
G 4.4 Differences with regard to the “Staatsverständnis” did not influence the
eID-based authentication function itself, but the opening for e-commerce,
the provision for electronic signatures as well as the supporting provisions
for components, hotlines etc.
If we apply a simple dichotomy, we can envisage a welfare state model where
government takes care of secure online authentication in e-government as well as in e-
commerce, provides electronic signatures in combination with eIDs provided by a state-
owned Certification Authority, subsidises the CA services as well as the eID function on
the eID card and provides customer support for citizens and service providers from
public and private sector without any charge. In contrast, according to a liberal state
model, government would only regulate the administration of citizens ID as well as the
production and distribution of the eID card and perhaps enact some privacy provisions.
Certainly the liberal state would not intervene into the authentication processes in e-
commerce, leave electronic signatures to the market and charge cost-related fees.
Table 14 reminds us of the relevant features of the four eIDMS in this respect.
We have already seen that with regard to the relation between e-government and
public safety objectives, it is not possible to relate such values and preferences to the
different political parties involved, as the priorities have not changed when there were
changes in government and former opposition parties took over government offices.
There is no clear pattern according to which one country adheres completely to the
liberal or the welfare state model. And there are no surveys or statistics available
addressing these values and their distribution among citizens. Table 14 shows that
Belgium comes closest to the welfare state model. But perhaps we are on the wrong
track with looking for values to which policymakers respond. Whether authentication
functions should be applied in e-commerce as well as in e-government may not be a
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question of such basic beliefs, but a question of motivating people to apply for an eID
card with its authentication function at all. As it seems unlikely that people opt in for
the authentication function for one or two online transactions with local as well as
federal governments per year, offerings in e-commerce are needed as trigger. The
more comprehensive provisions in Belgium therefore may just be the consequence of
the greater influence of the e-government objectives and the ambition to make the eID
as attractive to citizens as possible by low cost and additional functions.
With regard to the differences in dealing with electronic signatures, the German opt-
in provision continues the path established in the signature law: it is not a task of the state
to provide the means for the electronic authentication of documents. For paper-based
documents there are notaries, for electronic signatures a private certification authority
under state control. Although this model has not been successful regarding the diffusion
of electronic signatures, there has been no initiative to leave this path.
In contrast to that, in Belgium electronic signatures have been provided by one
single state-owned CA from the beginning. For the delivery on the eID card, Fedict
has bought certificates for every cardholder at a dumping price. Due to the
dominance of the e-government policy field, the belief that e-government needs
provisions for authentication of persons and signing of forms and documents from
the same card and the same provider determined the eIDMS concept.
With regard to the provision of card readers, client software and telephone hotline
support, all four countries first refrained from such a service, probably not because of
ideological reasons but because of budget problems, procurement law and logistical
problems. But slow diffusion and complaints made them change their minds. In
Germany the coincidence with a public recovery investment programme to fight the
economic crisis provided funds for subsidization of a starter kit and for hotline services.
Problem-solving effectiveness
The policy field analysis according to our conceptual framework adopts an interaction
as well as a problem-oriented perspective (see Scharpf 2000 and the introductory
chapter by Kubicek 2010). The problem-oriented perspective looks at the emergence
Table 14 Government´s support for different features of the eIDMS
BE ES AT GE
Authentication explicitly
open for e-commerce
No Yes Yes Yes
Electronic signature Opt out Mandatory Mandatory Opt in
Funding of card readers,
client software etc.
Recently Recently No Planned
Support hotline Yes Yes Yes Planned
Governance of e-signature State-owned
monopoly
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of a societal problem and the effectiveness of the policy chosen to deal with this
problem, in particular the creation of new or the change of existing institutions.
eIDMS are new institutions, which have been created to handle the societal problem
of lack of security of transactions in the Internet, which in turn are perceived as
barriers to full exploitation of the high potential of the Internet for economic growth
and societal progress (i.e. the “information society”), as maintained by the eEurope
Action Plan 2002 (European Council 2000) The concrete socio-technical solution
developed is a stronger authentication function on eID cards. There is no doubt that an
eID-based authentication is technically more secure than a user name and password
and that a gain in convenience is to be observed if users do not have to memorise
several different passwords and run the risk of identity theft. But do citizens recognise
and appreciate these gains and is the eID function in technical terms an appropriate
and effective solution to the problem as perceived by citizens?
In this section we will first look at the diffusion and usage of the eID function,
discuss the effectiveness of the solution for solving security problems as well as the
status of e-government as the initial policy field.
Diffusion and usage of eIDs
As shown in Table 1, the eID function for online authentication in the four countries
under comparison is offered on different grounds:
– In Belgium it is provided on an opt-out basis with the new eID card for citizens
older than 11 years.
– In Spain it is mandatory on the new eID card, issued to citizens aged 14 years or older.
– In Austria every citizen can apply for a Citizen Card implemented on a social
security card (e-card) or bankcard.
– In Germany citizens beyond the age of 16 will have to opt in, when applying for
a new ID card.
Thus the number of eID cards, except for Spain, differs from the number of eID
functions issued, and the diffusion of eIDs does not tell anything about their use for
online authentication. From the four country studies we have learned that usage is
extremely low.
G 5.1 Despite the differences between the eIDMS, the use of the eID-based
online authentication function is extremely low. For example for online
tax declarations, the share of online authentication by eID is less than 10%.
To compare usage patterns, we have collected data on electronic tax returns,
which are one of the most heavily used online e-government services in the four
countries. Table 15 depicts the rollout of eID cards, the activation of the eID-based
authentication function, the percentage of taxpayers providing electronic tax returns
and the percentage of those who use the eID for authentication, which was only
about 7% in Belgium, 0,2% in Spain and 1,0% in Austria in summer 2009.
These differences cannot be explained by different features of the eIDs and
eIDMS. The higher rate of use of the eID function in Belgium is probably due to the
longer rollout period and higher diffusion rate of eIDs. It may well be that the four
eIDMS, despite the differences we have highlighted so far, share some common
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features which are more important than the differences. In our conceptual
framework, we have included Rogers´ theory of the diffusion of innovations
(Rogers 2003) and assumed that the eID-based authentication function might meet
the same barriers to diffusion which electronic signatures have failed to overcome
(Fraunhofer Institute FOKUS 2006). According to Rogers, the rate of adoption is
higher for innovations which offer a clear relative advantage, are compatible with
past experiences and with the needs of potential adopters, which are triable and
observable, but which are not too complex and do not afford new skills.
G 5.2 All four eIDMS under investigation, despite their big differences, share
the barriers to diffusion as mentioned by Rogers:
& They are not compatible with established values and procedures.
& The technical process of authentication is complex and not easily understood.
& The relative advantage of higher security is not visible and not observable.
& The technical components are not easy to install and easy to use.
Usability and interoperability may be improved in the future, but the missing
“relative advantage” is a more deeply rooted problem, which is not only a matter of
perception. Relative advantage is a matter of effectiveness of a solution and a
question of balancing cost and benefits. From media research we know that media
selection in most cases is not based on rational choices only and that media
behaviour is a very conservative or in other words habitualised behaviour. Changes
only occur if problems have been experienced, if other options promise much greater
gratification or if peers adopt a new medium.
G 5.3 As long as previous modes of authentication are still offered, there is no
incentive for users to change to a more secure eID-based option, as this
requires additional financial investment and a change of habits.
Table 15 Rollout of eID cards and use of the eID function
BE ES AT
State of rollout early
in 2009
9.3 million, 90% of the
Belgians entitled to an
ID card
8 million, 25% of the
Spaniards entitled to
an ID card
8.4 million e-cards, 100%
of all citizens
eID function activated 7.5 million = 80% not necessary approx. 74,000, (0,9% ),
thereof approx. 20,000
office ID cards
Use rate for electronic
income tax
2008: 24% 21% 25.7%
2009: 56%
eID use rate for
income tax (% of
electronic apps.)
2008: 3.6% 2008: 0.1% 2008: 0,7%
2009: 14.2% (half of
them by service on
site of tax office)
2009: 0,2% 2009: 1,0%
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The main reason for low usage is that all previous modes of authentication are still
offered, e.g. by tax authorities as well as for online banking. As citizens have not
encountered any security or privacy problems with the tax offices personally and as
there were no security scandals reported in the mass media with regard to these services
either, citizens do not have any reason to change an established pattern of use.
The effectiveness of the eID-based solution to security concerns
Our assumption so far was that the eID function solves the security problems, which
policy-makers wanted to solve. Their main objective was to increase the volume of
transactions over the Internet for the sake of economic growth. The first assumption
in looking for a solution was that most of all security concerns keep people from
performing online transactions. The second assumption was that stronger authenti-
cation methods can reduce these security risks. So far both assumptions have not
been questioned. There are no comprehensive and valid data to check both
assumptions. However an OECD background paper, “Measuring Security and Trust
in the Online Environment: AView Using Official Data” (OECD 2008), gives some
hints. The working party regrets that in contrast to the significance of the perception
of security and privacy of online services there are no reliable and comparable
statistics in the Member States. From available statistics they conclude, “that in
general privacy or security concerns are not an important reason for not having
Internet access at home”. The most important barriers in 2000 were “lack of interest,
lack of money and lack of skills” (p. 9). However, there are national differences with
regard to privacy or security concerns (p. 10).
The security or safety concerns of citizens according to surveys relate to phishing
attacks, mistrust in service providers regarding the delivery of goods and services or
handling complaints (Table 16). The most frequent personal experience relates to the
abuse of personal data, fraudulent payment and unsatisfactory responses to
complaints. The Eurobarometer data on privacy concerns also show that almost
two thirds of the respondents in all for countries are concerned about personal data
protection on the Internet (Spain 72%, Belgium 69%, Austria and Germany 67%)
and that there is little trust in mail order companies. Only 21% in Belgium, 14% in
Spain and 18% in Austria and Germany say that they trust data privacy protection by
mail order companies (Gallup Organisation 2008).
With regard to the second assumption, there is no doubt that stronger
authentication provides for a higher degree of security. But the question is “For
whom?” The three one-sided authentication processes established in Belgium, Spain
and Austria do not provide a solution to these problems. They do neither protect
from phishing attacks nor do they provide for more trust or more certainty regarding
complaints. They only allow for more safety for service providers with regard to the
identity of their customers. In other words, citizens/consumers are expected to make
investments to increase the safety of service providers. Only the access certification
of providers in the German eIDMS offers clear safety benefits to the citizens/
consumers as well. This may well explain the low usage rate.
G 5.4 eIDMS with a one-sided authentication function do not provide a solution
for security/safety and privacy concerns of citizens but increase the safety
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of service providers. They do not offer a relative advantage to citizens and
show an asymmetric distribution of cost and benefits where users have to
invest to increase the benefits of service providers.
The asymmetric distribution of cost and benefits of eID functions is the same as for
electronic signatures. But would a change to a double-sided authentication process alone
change the situation? This is not very likely because in particular those services, which
raise problems of trust, would have to offer the double-sided authentication processes.
Not the federal agencies, the local municipalities, the Ebays and Amazons are the
subject of concerns, but the service providers with unknown names. Could they be
forced to offer eID-based authentication? Can consumers force them by exit?5
G 5.5 There is a vicious circle: As long as existing methods of authentication are
offered in parallel, there is no need to adopt eID based authentication.
However, providers of frequently used e-government services cannot close
other ways of authentication as long as not all potential users have installed the
equipment for the eID based mode auf authentication and are ready to use it.
By selecting a new eID card as token for the eID function, policy makers accepted
a rollout period of five to 10 years until every citizen is equipped with the new token
and before other methods of authentication can be closed. But even where the rollout
is completed, as in Belgium, the weaker methods of authentication are still offered,
even by other federal agencies. This raises questions concerning the power of e-
government actors and the structure of this policy field.
Preliminary conclusions and outlook
In this final section we will summarize the policy field analysis, draw some
conclusions in this respect and provide a preliminary answer to the two research
Table 16 Safety and security oncerns in the online environment (OECD 2008)
BE ES AT GE
Security concerns for not buying/ordering goods online (% of Internet users) – 70% 20% 27%
Privacy concerns ... – 60% 18% 23%
Trust concerns and complaints 18% 17% 10% 20%
Internet users victim
- of abuse of personal information (% users) – 15% 2% 2%
- of fraudulent payment (% of Internet users) – 1% 1% 1%
- % of those who ordered goods – 7% 4% –
Security problems encountered 1% 2% 1% 1%
Unsatisfactory response to complaints 1% 7% 2% 6%
5 Diffusion and adaption was not the main focus of this research. To do more thorough analysis, a different
research design would be necessary. To take such a closer look may well be the objective of a follow-up
project.
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questions at the outset of this project. These answers are qualified as preliminary, as
there will be a second phase of analysis by looking at four other cases in this special
issue, selected by a “most different design”. Only after this second step we may dare
a grounded theory on the path dependency of European eIDMS.
Policy field analysis of e-government and Internet security
When introducing the problem-oriented perspective of policy field analysis, Scharpf
mentioned the problem that political scientists in most cases cannot judge by
themselves whether a solution chosen by policy makers is an appropriate and
effective answer to the problem they wanted to address (Scharpf 2000). In our case
this depends on the definition of the problem. If we define the problem as “weak
authentication for online” services, stronger authentication by eIDs is an appropriate
response. If we define the problem as security and privacy concerns of citizens,
which make them refrain from online transactions in e-government and e-commerce,
we have to maintain that a one-sided authentication is no effective response,
regardless how strong the authentication method is. If we define the policy problem
as underutilisation of the Internet because of security and privacy concerns, we have
to consider whether security concerns are indeed the strongest barrier to online
transactions or at least among the top barriers. Policy makers in three of the four
countries under study followed the advice of technical security experts who reduced
problems of safety and security on issues of encryption and certificates, while the
concerns of citizens regard issues of trust in remote service providers. But trust is a
complex phenomenon and there are no recipes to create a trustful environment in the
social sense. While a trusted environment in the technical sense can be established
via a PKI infrastructure, we do not know how to develop a climate or culture of trust
within a certain socio-ecomic context or environment.
G 6.1 An eIDMS is no appropriate and no effective response to security and
safety concerns of citizen in relation to e-government and e-commerce.
Policy makers following the advice of technical experts reduced the
societal problem to a partial technical problem.
Coming back to e-government as the policy field where the initiatives for eIDs
started, it seems that within this field, technical aspects of security gained more attention
and weight than the modernisation of public services. Picking up the discussion of
different “strategies of modernizing the state” by Margetts and Hood (2010), we can
argue that establishing an eIDMS emphasises technical integration and interconnec-
tedness by technological development, but to a much lesser degree considers
economic efficiency. In the case of the eIDM, the temptation to reduce the problem
of trust to technical security features was particularly great where the policy field of
public safety and police gained leadership, in which the security of ID cards is a
crucial issue which never has been subject to economic efficiency considerations.
In addition policy makers from the e-government field were not able to get all federal
agencies and local municipalities to favour the eID-based authentication and to close the
less secure ones. This is due to the structure of the e-government policy field. National
governments who have successfully introduced an eIDMS are only in charge of a few
e-government services dedicated to citizens. Most of the public services selected by
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the Council of Ministers for e-government benchmarking are offered by offices at the
state, regional, provincial or local level. These units are quite autonomous with regard
to which services they offer online and which authentication method they make use of.
What national governments can do is to regulate the eID as a tool but not the larger
eIDMS including the areas of its application.
G 6.2 The introduction of more secure online authentication via an eIDMS was
an element in national e-government plans. But these plans are quite
different from plans and roadmaps in other policy fields. They are just a
compilation of a number of projects and do not have the support of the
most important policy actors for implementation.
The introduction of stronger authentication in e-government may well be in the
interest of e-government actors as there is a need by governmental agencies to
authenticate the citizens applying for certain services. Therefore the development of the
eIDMS has been conceived as a cross-cutting project within national e-government
programmes. However the eIDMS has to be placed in a larger e-government landscape
including those services where the authentication function has to be applied. But this is
where the policy approach has failed. As mentioned in G 5.2.2., there is a vicious circle,
which might be overcome by a more comprehensive strategy of modernising the
delivery of public services. The low take-up of eID functions in general has to be
assessed in connection with a slow-down in progress of e-government services in
general. The dispersed distribution of authority between different levels of government
concerning the question of which public services are offered online and what kind of
authentication is required creates a structural barrier to the employment of the eID.
There is not much to gain for local governments by changing their existing procedures.
Therefore either a legal obligation to adopt stronger authentication methods for at
least certain public online services and/or financial incentives would be necessary to
get out of the vicious circle. But so far national governments did not even succeed in
making eID-based authentication mandatory for the public online services at the
national level. The only exception is the My-file-service in Belgium. It seems that e-
government is not even a policy field of high priority at the national level.
Answering the research questions
Starting from the observation that concerns about the security of online transactions
are a barrier for many people to use e-government and e-commerce services,
stronger methods of authentication have been considered as a solution. The policy
response was the introduction of eID-based authentication methods and the
establishment of a national eIDMS. Such systems raised sometimes many,
sometimes only a few or none privacy concerns in the Member States of the
European Union and beyond. In addition it was expected at least by some observers
that eIDs would fundamentally change the relation between citizens and state.
Recognizing that there are significant differences between the eIDMS established in
the Member States, the research project aimed at answering two questions:
& How can these differences be described and explained?
& To which extent do these systems change the citizen-state relationship?
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The comparative analysis for four selected countries has shown that most of the
differences can be explained by previously existing differences between the national
ID-related administrative systems. Regarding organisational and regulatory aspects,
the changes were incremental rather than radical. They either continued existing
patterns or transposed them into the digital world. A high degree of path continuity
could be stated for the ID-based online authentication. This finding provides an
answer to the second research question as well:
G 6.3 In contrast to expectations and fears that eID might change the relation
between the citizens and the state in the virtual world or even beyond in
the physical world, the range and degree of changes and effects in the four
countries analysed so far is still very modest and will probably be so for at
least another 10 years. When a newly inroduced eID card is chosen as
token for the eID, by most citizens it is still considered and used as a
means for interpersonal authentication as was the previous eID card, now
only with a chip.
But this is a preliminary statement because of the selection of the four case
studies: The four countries under investigation have been selected because all of
them already had an established ID management system with an obligation to
register, a central registry, a regulation on holding a national ID document. The
introduction of an eID did not change these basic conditions. However, if the
introduction of an online authentication becomes an occasion for or is combined
with introducing more fundamental obligations to register or to hold certain ID
documents, we have to deal with a radical innovation. This is the case in the UK.
Therefore the hypotheses developed here do not apply to the UK. However, we also
have to recognise that the British literature on eID takes a particular view, which is
not representative for the rest of Europe.
There is a second reason why the eID function has not changed the citizen-
government relation, and this is due to a misconception of this function by those
expecting this change. In the discussion about the conflict between security and
privacy and the potential changes in the citizen-state relationship, which has been
addressed in the introductory paper (Kubicek 2010), the different meanings and
contexts of eIDs are not clearly separated and thereby cause misunderstandings. The
present analysis deals with eID-based online authentication. This is an element of
the front offices of e-government. Much of the concerns, however, regard the
exchange of personal data of citizens between different back offices in public
administration. As shown in Fig. 1 in the introduction (Kubicek 2010), this data
comes from diverse sources, from paper-based forms, from other back offices and
only to a small degree via online services and even less via eID-based online
authentication. More importantly, eID-based online authentication does not change
the kind and frequency of data exchange between back offices. Only the Austrian
eIDMS via Sector-Specific PINs tries to reduce this risk.
In a previous, unpublished study, the Institute for Information Management
Bremen lead by the senior author of this paper has analyzed the exchange of person-
related data between 16 sectors of public administration in Germany in order to
assess eventual problems with the identification of citizens in the different databases
and legacy systems. Name, date of birth and sometimes address were considered by
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representatives of these offices to allow for sufficient identification. There were
problems regarding the update of changes and the data assigned to these persons, but
no demands, for example, to introduce a unique identifier. The analysis showed that
there is a complex network of exchange of person-related data between the agencies,
entitled by several laws and directives, and that there are no technical means to
prevent surpassing these legal limitations. In other words:
G. 6.4 Privacy concerns addressing the exchange of person-related data between
different government back offices are without any doubt justified, but they
are not influenced by the eIDMS for online authentication in the front
offices. Rather front office and back office processes are quite
independent with regard to privacy intrusion and provisions.
This is also the case for privacy concerns regarding the use of eID cards for visual
inspection at border controls, including biometric data. Data are transmitted between
different police and customs offices between different countries in a non-transparent
way. However, this process has started with the previous machine-readable ID cards,
is extended with electronic passports and will be further supported by eID cards. But
the respective functions of the ID card differ from the online authentication and more
important: again it is the exchange between the different back office systems, which
has to be addressed.
So one additional contribution of this research to the discussion about electronic
identity beyond the empirical analysis of one partial area may lie in distinguishing
different domains and diverting attention from the front office applications of
electronic identities to the identity-related data exchange between back offices in the
context of public services in general and border control in particular.
Reflecting the research approach
Because the four countries analysed so far cannot be considered to be representative,
there is a need for extending the sample. There are no criteria for the
representativeness of countries with regard to ID systems or eID systems. But it is
obvious that Scandinavian and Eastern European countries are missing. Therefore in
a second and final step of this project, experts in Denmark, Estonia, Finland and
Sweden have been asked to summarise the development in their countries and to
review the generalisations developed here and to assess to which degree they apply
to the processes in their country or which modifications are necessary to get hold of
differences which have occurred there. These cases will be presented in the
following sections of this Special Issue (see Hoff and Hoff 2010; Grönlund 2010;
Martens 2010; Rissanen 2010). Only after including these cases in a more
comprehensive comparison, we may evaluate the fruitfulness of our research
approach and the conceptual framework.
With regard to the fruitfulness of the research approach and the conceptual
framework, however, a few conclusions may be drawn already. The combination of
an institutional actors perspective with path analysis has allowed for plausible
explanations of differences between the four eIDMS. The differences identified with
regard to technical, organisational and regulatory aspects prove that there is no
technological determinism and support the Social Shaping of Technology School’s
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basic assumption that technical choices exist, even if we are not able to explain any
detail of the outcome of these choices right now.
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